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Abstract
Supervenience is an important philosophical concept. In this paper,
inspired by the supervenience-determined consequence relation and the se-
mantics of agreement operator, we introduce a modal logic of superveni-
ence, which has a dyadic operator of supervenience as a sole modality.
The semantics of supervenience modality is very natural to correspond
to the supervenience-determined consequence relation, in a quite similar
way that the strict implication corresponds to the inference-determined
consequence relation. We show that this new logic is more expressive
than the modal logic of agreement, by proposing a notion of bisimula-
tion for the latter logic. We provide a sound proof system for our new
logic. We also lift on to more general logics of supervenience. Related to
this, we compare propositional logic of determinacy and non-contingency
in expressive powers, and give axiomatizations of propositional logic of
determinacy over various classes of frames, thereby resolving an open re-
search direction listed in [11, Sec. 8.2]. As a corollary, we also present
an alternative axiomatization for propositional logic of determinacy over
universal models. We conclude with a lot of future work.
Keywords: supervenience, agreement, determinacy, contingency, expressivity,
axiomatization, bisimulation
1 Introduction
1.1 Philosophical motivation
Past decades witness an increasing interest in the concept of supervenience,
which has traditionally been used as a relation between sets of properties.1 A
set A of properties (called ‘supervenient properties’) is said to supervene on
another set B (called ‘subveinent properties’), just in case if B-properties are
indistinguishable, then so are A-properties; in other words, agreement in respect
1There are some exceptions, though. For instance, in [16], [15] and [5], supervenience is a
relation between sets of predicates, between a pair of languages, and between a predicate and
a set of predicates in a language, respectively.
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of B-properties implies agreement in respect of A-properties. In slogan form,
“there cannot be an A-different without a B-difference” [46]. The core idea of
supervenience is that fixing subvenient properties fixes its supervenient ones; or
equivalently, subvenient properties determine supervenient properties.
The notion of supervenience dates back at least to G. E. Moore’s classical
work [48], where he described some certain dependency relationship between
moral and non-moral properties. However, Moore did not use the term ‘super-
venience’ explicitly; it was R. M. Hare [14] that introduced the term into the
philosophical literature, to characterize a relationship between moral properties
and natural properties.2 Thanks to Donald Davidson [3], the term ‘superveni-
ence’ was first introduced into contemporary philosophy of mind,3 which opened
up a new research direction in this area and other branches of philosophy, see
e.g. [16, 31, 32, 18, 15, 19, 33, 43, 20, 21, 41]. It is alleged (e.g. [46]) that
every major figure in the history of western philosophy has been at least im-
plicitly committed to some supervenience thesis. For example, Leibniz used
the Latin word ‘supervenire’, to state the thesis that relations are supervenient
on properties (e.g. [30]); G. E. Moore stated that “one of the most important
facts about qualitative difference · · · [is that] two things cannot differ in quality
without differing in intrinsic nature” ([48, p. 263]); David Lewis used a thesis of
Humean supervenience to express that the whole truth about a world like ours
supervenes on the spatiotemporal distribution of local qualities [45, pp. ix–xvi].
The notion of supervenience is ubiquitous in our daily life. For instance, the
aesthetic properties of a work of art supervene on its physical properties, the
price of a commodity supervenes on its supply and demand, effects supervene
on causes, and the mental supervenes on the physical. According to the chart
of levels of existence [56], atoms supervene on elementary particles, molecules
supervene on atoms, cells supervene on molecules, and so on. Moreover, a
number of interesting doctrines and problems can be formulated in terms of
supervenience. A paradigmatic example is physicalism, which may be construed
as a thesis that “everything supervenes on the physical” [2]. Mereology may
2Hare [14, p. 145] stated “First, let us take that characteristic of ‘good’ which has been
called its supervenience. Suppose that we say ‘St. Francis was a good man’. It is logically
impossible to say this and to maintain at the same time that there might have been another
man placed in precisely the same circumstances as St. Francis, and who behaved in them in
exactly the same way, but who differed from St. Francis in this respect only, that he was not a
good man.” Similar idea can be identified in other places in that book, e.g. pp. 80-81, p. 134,
p. 153. Here, Hare spoke of supervenience as a characteristic of the term ‘good’. But as [34,
p. 155] commented, it is better to think of supervenience as a relation between the property
of being a good man and the properties such as patterns of behavior and traits of character.
3Donald Davidson used psychophysical supervenience to defend a position of anomalous
monism that although the mental supervenes on the physical, the former cannot be reduced
to the latter, as he said on [3, p. 88]: “Although the position I describe denies there are
psychophysical laws, it is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in some
sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be
taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in
some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in
some physical respect. Dependence or supervenience of this kind does not entail reducibility
through law or definition · · · .” Such a supervenience thesis was explicitly advocated on
Davidson [6, pp. 716-717].
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be explained as mereological supervenience, i.e., the whole supervenes on its
parts (cf. e.g. [39, p. 101]). Determinism can be roughly construed as a thesis
that everything to the future supervenes on the present, and perhaps past, facts.
All of the distinction between internalism and externalism can be characterized
by means of supervenience theses [46]. Mind-body problem may be rephrased as
to whether the psychophysical supervenience thesis holds, i.e., are psychological
properties supervenient upon physical properties (e.g. [3, 32, 33, 38])?
There are so many distinct formulations for this concept, e.g., individual
supervenience, local supervenience, global supervenience, weak supervenience,
strong supervenience, similarity-based supervenience, regional supervenience,
local-local supervenience and strong-local-local supervenience, multiple domain
supervenience (c.f. e.g. [34, 35, 19, 15, 17, 36]), that David Lewis thought of it as
an ‘unlovely proliferation’ [44, p. 14]. No matter how different the formulations
are, they all conform to the aforementioned core idea of supervenience — that
is, fixing the subvenient properties fixes the supervenient properties.
Supervenience has many applications, among which a central use is so-called
‘argument by a false implied supervenience thesis’. It is well known that the
reduction of A to B implies the supervenience of A on B; in short, reduction im-
plies supervenience. Thus for one to argue against a reduction thesis, it suffices
to falsify the corresponding supervenience thesis. Other applications include
characterizing the distinctions between Internalism and Externalism, character-
izing physicalism, characterizing haecceitism, and so on. For the details of all
these applications, a highly recommendation would be [46].
In spite of so many philosophical discussions for the notion of superveni-
ence, there have been few studies in the sphere of logic. The only logical work
dealing with supervenience that we have found in the literature are a series of
publications written by Humberstone [22, 23, 25, 26], all of which are in terms of
valuations/truth assignments. The related notions of supervenience are contin-
gency, agreement, and dependence/determination, see [9, 27, 11] and references
thereof.4 We will propose a modal logic of supervenience, and compare our logic
with these related logics.
In this paper, unlike Humberstone’s method, we will treat the notion of
supervenience as a primitive modality, based on possible worlds rather than
valuations. This idea seems very natural, since for instance, in an oft-cited
work [21], Horgan claimed, “Supervenience, then, is a modal notion.” (p. 555).
Besides, instead of exploring supervenience for properties, we investigate the
supervenience relation between two (sets of) sentences/formulas, which can be
justified by Kim’s claim “One could also speak of supervenience for sentences,
facts, events, propositions, and languages” [34, p. 155]. We will demonstrate
that the sentence supervenience has many similar results to the property super-
venience.
4It was argued in [52] that supervenience is the converse concept of determination. That
is, to say that a set A of properties supervenes on another set B, is equivalent to say that B
determines A.
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1.2 Technical motivation
Technically, our paper is mainly inspired by a notion of supervenience-determined
consequence relation, together with the semantics of an agreement operator in
the literature.
Humberstone [23] distinguished between two types of consequence relations:
inference-determined and supervenience-determined. Inference-determined ver-
sion is just Tarski’s consequence relation, i.e., given a class of valuations V , the
inference-determined consequence relation by V , denoted V , is defined as:
Γ V A ⇐⇒ for all valuations v ∈ V ,
if v(B) = T for each B ∈ Γ, then v(A) = T.
In comparison, the consequence relation supervenience-determined by V , de-
noted V , is defined as:
Γ V A ⇐⇒ for all valuations u, v ∈ V ,
if u(B) = v(B) for each B ∈ Γ, then u(A) = v(A).
Inspired by the supervenience-determined consequence relation, in a rather
natural sense, we introduce a dyadic operator ⇛ and interpret it on a Kripke
model M with a domain W as follows:
M, w  B ⇛ A ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈ W, if (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B),
then (M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A). (Def 1)
This definition is in line with the supervenience-determined consequence
relation outlined above. Note that we now take u and v as possible worlds rather
than valuations. An obvious difference between possible worlds and valuations
is, whereas there can be two distinct possible worlds in a model which agree on
all formulas, that would not be so for valuations.
But note that the modality ⇛ is global but not local, in the sense that
its truth does not depend on the designated state where it is evaluated. An
equivalent saying for this is that ⇛ is defined on a universal model.
There are also alternative variations for (Def 1). Recall that the agreement
operator (denoted O) is interpreted on a generalized model M = 〈W,S, V 〉,
whereW and V are as usual, and S is a ternary relation without any constraints
(for more details, see [27, p. 107], or Section 2.2).
M, w  OA ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈W such that Swuv,
we have (M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A).
Now inspired by the semantics of agreement operator, we add the premise
Swuv into the right-hand side of (Def 1), thereby obtaining a much more general
semantics for ⇛:
M, w  B ⇛ A ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈M such that Swuv,
if (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B),
then (M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A). (Def 2)
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The modality ⇛ in (Def 2) is now local, which takes the global version (Def 1)
as a special case when the accessibility relation S is universal, in the sense that
for all w, u, v ∈ W , it holds that Swuv.
The reminder is organized as follows. After briefly reviewing the related lo-
gics in the literature (Sec. 2), we introduce a modal logic L⇛ of supervenience,
defining its language and semantics (Sec. 3). Then we compare the relative
expressive powers of L⇛ and the modal logic LO of agreement, by proposing
a bisimulation notion for the latter (Sec. 4). Besides providing a sound proof
system for L⇛ (Sec. 5), we lift the new logic on to more general logics of su-
pervenience in Sec. 6, depending on the arity of the concerned supervenience
operators, which take propositional logic LD of determinacy as a special case
when the underlying accessibility relation is universal. Sec. 6 contains two main
results: Sec. 6.1 compares the expressive power of contingency logic L∆ and LD,
where it turns out that they are equally expressive over the class of all models;
in Sec. 6.2, we give axiomatizations for LD over various classes of frames, via a
reduction to the completeness of their based axiomatizations for L∆. The two
results obtained in Sec. 6, we think, complete an open research direction listed
in [11]. As a corollary, we present an alternative axiomatization for LD over
universal models. We conclude with a lot of future work in Sec. 7.
In summary, our contributions consist of:
• A semantics of the supervenience operator (Sec. 3) and a sound proof
system for the modal logic L⇛ of supervenience (Sec. 5);
• A bisimulation notion for the modal logic LO of agreement (Sec. 4);
• L⇛ is more expressive than LO over the class of all models (Sec. 4);
• Contingency logic is equally expressive as propositional logic LD of de-
terminacy over the class of all models (Sec. 6.1);
• Various axiomatizations for LD over various frame classes, and complete-
ness proof via a reduction method (Sec. 6.2);
• An alternative axiomatization for LD over universal models (Sec. 6.2).
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we let P denote the set of proposition symbols, and let
p denote an element of P. Also, we use the notation D, T , 4, 5, B, S4, S5, 45,
and KD45 to stand for, respectively, the class of all serial frames, the class of
all reflexive frames, the class of all transitive frames, the class of all Euclidean
frames, the class of all symmetric frames, the class of all reflexive and transitive
frames, the class of reflexive and Euclidean frame, the class of transitive and
Euclidean frames, and the class of all serial, transitive and Euclidean frames.
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2.1 Contingency logic
Contingency logic is an extension of propositional logic with a primitive modality
∆. In symbol, contingency logic L∆ is defined inductively as the following BNF:
A ::= p | ¬A | A ∧ A | ∆A
Where ∆A is read “it is non-contingent that A”. Boolean connectives are in-
terpreted as usual, and the non-contingency operator ∆ is interpreted by the
following semantics: given a Kripke modelM = 〈W,R, V 〉 and a world w ∈W ,
M, w  ∆A ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈ W such that wRu and wRv,
we have (M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A).
It is known that ∆ is definable in terms of the necessity operator , as ∆A =df
A∨¬A, see e.g. [47]. However, ∆ has some advantages over , for example,
as the definition itself indicates, the statements with ∆ is exponentially more
succinct than those with  instead of ∆ which are intended to express the same
propositions [55]. The modality ∆ also invites novel techniques in axiomatizing
uni-modal and poly-modal L∆ over various frame classes, see [24, 40, 57, 54, 8, 9].
A variety of axiomatizations have been proposed in the literature, we here adopt
the axiomatizations of [9] for the sake of reference in Sec. 6.2.5
System CL
Axiom Schemas Rules
TAUT all instances of tautologies MP
A,A→ B
B
∆Con ∆(A→ B) ∧∆(¬A→ B)→ ∆B GEN∆
A
∆A
∆Dis ∆A→ ∆(A→ B) ∨∆(¬A→ C) RE∆
A↔ B
∆A↔ ∆B
∆Equ ∆A↔ ∆¬A
Notation Axiom Schemas Systems Frames
CL D
∆T ∆A ∧∆(A→ B) ∧ A→ ∆B CLT = CL+∆T T
∆4 ∆A→ ∆(∆A ∨B) CL4 = CL+∆4 4
∆5 ¬∆A→ ∆(¬∆A ∨B) CL5 = CL+∆5 5
∆B A→ ∆((∆A ∧∆(A→ B) ∧ ¬∆B)→ C) CLB = CL+∆B B
w∆4 ∆A→ ∆∆A CLS4 = CL+∆T + w∆4 S4
w∆5 ¬∆A→ ∆¬∆A CLS5 = CL+∆T + w∆5 S5
CL45 = CL+∆4+∆5 45(KD45)
5As shown in [27, pp. 110-111], the axiom ∆Dis can be replaced with ∆A → ∆(A →
D) ∨∆(¬A → D), which is denoted by H. The proof is as follows: firstly, H is obviously a
special instance of ∆Dis when B = C = D. Conversely, let D be (A→ B) ∧ (¬A→ C), then
it is easy to show that (A → B) ↔ (A → (A → B) ∧ (¬A → C)) and (¬A → C) ↔ (¬A →
(A→ B) ∧ (¬A→ C)), i.e. (A→ B)↔ (A→ D) and (¬A→ C)↔ (¬A→ D), respectively,
where B,C are arbitrary. Then using the rule RE∆, we infer the axiom ∆Dis from H.
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Theorem 1. (c.f. [8, 9]) CL is sound and strongly complete with respect to the
class of all frames and also the class of all D-frames, other extensions of CL are
sound and strongly complete with respect to the corresponding class of frames
listed in the above table.
2.2 The modal logic of agreement
Humberstone [27] proposed a so-called ‘the modal logic of agreement’, to lift
the study of contingency logic on to a general modal logic. The modal logic
of agreement LO extends propositional logic with an operator of agreement O
rather than ∆:
A ::= p | ¬A | A ∧A | OA.
The modelM, called ‘a generalized model’ in [27], is a triple 〈W,S, V 〉, where
W and V are as usual, i.e., W is a set of possible worlds and V a valuation from
P to P(W ), and S is a ternary relation without any constraints. The agreement
operator O is interpreted as follows:
M, w  OA ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈W such that Swuv,
we have (M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A).
Intuitively, Swuv means that u and v stand in the relation that is the value
of S for the argument w. When S is defined such that, for any w, u, v ∈ W ,
Swuv holds just in case wRu and wRv, we obtain the interpretation of non-
contingency operator ∆, and thus the interpretation of ∆ is a special case of
that of O. Other special cases for the semantics of O refer to [27, Sec. 3].
In the sequel, partly inspired by the work of the modal logic of agreement,
we will introduce one of its extensions, called ‘a logic of supervenience’, in which
our supervenience operator is defined on the generalized models. We will show
that our new logic is more expressive than LO, by defining a bisimulation notion
of LO.
2.3 Propositional logic of determinacy
Propositional logic of determinacy LD is introduced in [11], a logic which ex-
tends propositional logic with dependence formulas D(A1, · · · , An;B), where
A1, · · · , An, B are all arbitrary formulas in LD. In symbol,
A ::= p | ¬A | A ∧ A | D(A, · · · , A;A)
Where the tuple (A, · · · , A;A) contains n+ 1 formulas for any n ∈ N.
Formula D(A1, · · · , An;B) is read “B depends only on A1, · · · , An”, intuit-
ively meaning that the truth value of B is determined by the set of truth values
of A1, · · · , An; or roughly speaking, once the truth value of each Ai (i ∈ [1, n])
are fixed, the truth value of B is also fixed. The determinacy operator D is
interpreted in [11] on Kripke models M = 〈W,R, V 〉, where W and V are as
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usual, and R is the universal relation, i.e. for all w, v ∈W , wRv.
M, w  D(A1, · · · , An;B) ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈W such that wRu and wRv,
if (M, u  Ai ⇐⇒ M, v  Ai) holds for all i ≤ n,
then (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B).
At the end of that paper [11, Sec. 8.2], the semantic of D was generalized
into the general modal setting, without any constraints for the accessibility
relation R. It left as an open research direction how to investigate the de-
terminacy operator D over various classes of Kripke models. In this article, we
will complete this research direction, by showing that D is inter-definable with
the non-contingency operator ∆ on all Kripke models, and we will also give
axiomatizations of LD over various frame classes.
3 Supervenience logic
In this section, we introduce our modal logic of supervenience. Before doing
that, let us display an interesting contrast between the semantics of our new
modality with that of strict implication.
Being unhappy with a so-called ‘paradoxes of material implication’, in his
seminal work [42], Lewis defined a strict implication J, with A J B read as “A
strictly implies B” and interpreted by the following:
M, w  A J B ⇐⇒ for all u ∈M such that Rwu, if M, u  A, then M, u  B.
The operator J internalizes the claim for B’s being a consequence, by some
inference-determined consequence relation, of a formula A. Recall that given
a class of valuations V , the consequence relation inference-determined by V ,
denoted V , defined as:
Γ V A ⇐⇒ for all valuations v ∈ V ,
if v(B) = T for each B ∈ Γ, then v(A) = T.
In comparison, the consequence relation supervenience-determined by V [23],
denoted V , is defined as:
Γ V A ⇐⇒ for all valuations u, v ∈ V ,
if u(B) = v(B) for each B ∈ Γ, then u(A) = v(A).
Then it is very natural to define a binary operator ⇛ as follows:
M, w  A⇛ B ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈M such that Swuv,
if M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A,
then M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B.
We thus obtain our supervenience operator. The operator⇛ internalizes the
claim that B is a consequence by some supervenience-determined consequence
8
relation of A. Roughly speaking, just as strict implication is a localized object-
language modality corresponding to inference-determined consequence (in the
1-premiss case), the supervenience operator is a localized object-language mod-
ality corresponding to supervenience-determined consequence (in the 1-premiss
case).
Definition 2. The language L⇛ of the modal logic of supervenience is defined
inductively by the following BNF:
A ::= p | ¬A | (A ∧ A) | (A⇛ A)
Thus L⇛ is an extension of propositional logic with a new dyadic modality
⇛. The construct A ⇛ B is read “B supervenes on A”. Intuitively, B su-
pervenes on A, if (given some premise,) once the truth value of A is fixed, the
truth value of B is also fixed. We always drop the parentheses around formulas
whenever no confusion arises.
A model of L⇛ is a triple M = 〈W,S, V 〉, where W is a nonempty set of
worlds, V : P→ P(W ) is a valuation, and S a function assigning to each w ∈W
a binary relation Sw on W . We can equally think of S as an arbitrary ternary
relation on W . If w ∈ W , we say the pair (M, w) is a pointed model. A frame
of L⇛ is a model of L⇛ without a valuation.
Given a Kripke model M = 〈W,S, V 〉 and a world w ∈W , the semantics of
L⇛ is defined as follows.
M, w  p ⇐⇒ w ∈ V (p)
M, w  ¬A ⇐⇒ M, w 2 A
M, w  A ∧B ⇐⇒ M, w  A and M, w  B
M, w  A⇛ B ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈ W such that Swuv,
if (M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A),
then (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B).
The notions of truth, validity and satisfiability are defined as usual. For
instance, formula A is true at w in M, if M, w  A, in this case we also write
w  A when M is clear; A is valid on a class of frames F , written F  A, if for
all frames F in F , for all models M based on F , and for all worlds w inM, we
have M, w  A; A is valid, written  A, if for all classes of frames F , we have
F  A; A is satisfiable, if there is a model M and a world w in M such that
M, w  A.
Our operator ⇛ conform to the core idea of supervenience in philosophy:
fixing the subvenient fixes the supervenient. Note that our language is an ex-
tension of the language of the modal logic of agreement LO (see Section 2.2),
since one may easily verify that  OB ↔ (⊤⇛ B).6 In what follows, for simpli-
city’s sake, we will use OB to abbreviate ⊤⇛ B, and A ⇚⇛ B to abbreviate
(A ⇛ B) ∧ (B ⇛ A). Intuitively, OB says that the truth value of B is fixed,
and A⇚⇛ B says that A and B supervene on each other.
6We could equally well use ⊥ in place of ⊤ here.
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The operator⇛ is not definable/expressible in terms of J. Take two models
M andM′ as an example, where inM, Swuv with p, q are only true at w, while
in M′, S′w′u
′v′ with p is true at all worlds, and q is true only at w′ and u′, and
accessibility relations are empty on both models. One may check that (M, w)
and (M′, w′) can be distinguished by p⇛ q, but cannot be distinguished by any
formula of the language which extends propositional logic with the operator J.
As discussed in [28, Subsection 3.34] (also see [29, pp. 188–189] for a sum-
mary), every binary connective gives rise to binary relations between formulas
in two ways: a local way and a global way. The same story goes with our
binary connective/modality ⇛: given a model M and a world w therein, we
can define a (local) relation R⇛M,w and a (global) relation R
⇛
M, respectively,
as {(A,B) | M,w  A ⇛ B} and {(A,B) | M  A ⇛ B} (or equivalently,⋂
w∈MR
⇛
M,w). Then these two relations are both preorder, that is, reflexive
and transitive relations, as easily follows from Prop. 3, where item (i) says that
everything is supervenient on itself, and item (ii) says that if one thing is su-
pervenient on a thing which supervenes on another thing, then the first thing
supervenes on the third thing. In short, the operator ⇛ gives rise to two kinds
of supervenience relations between formulas.
Proposition 3. Let A,B,C ∈ L⇛.
(i)  A⇛ A (Supervenience is reflexive),
(ii)  (A⇛ B) ∧ (B ⇛ C)→ (A⇛ C) (Supervenience is transitive).
(iii) 2 (A⇛ B)→ (B ⇛ A) (Supervenience is not symmetric).
Intuitively, if the truth value of B is fixed, then the truth value of B is still
fixed, no matter whether the concerned subvenient is fixed.
Fact 4.  OB → A⇛ B.
Proof. Straightforward by the semantical definitions of O and ⇛.
If the truth value of A is fixed, then “B supervenes on A” is amount to that
the truth value of B is fixed.
Proposition 5.  OA→ (A⇛ B ↔ OB).
Proof. Let M = 〈W,S, V 〉 be a model and w ∈ W such that M, w  OA.
By Fact 4, we have that M, w  OB → A ⇛ B. Left to show is the other
direction. To this end, assume, for a contradiction, that M, w  A ⇛ B and
M, w 2 OB. Then there exist u, v ∈ W such that Swuv, and it is not the
case that (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B). By the fact that M, w  OA and
Swuv, we obtain that (M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A). Thus we have found
two worlds u, v ∈ W with Swuv and (M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A) but not
(M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B), which is contrary to the assumption.
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4 Comparing the expressive powers of L⇛ and
LO
In this section, we compare the relative expressive powers of L⇛ and LO. The
prime result is that, L⇛ is more expressive than LO. We first introduce the
definition of expressivity.
Definition 6 (Expressivity). Let two logical languages L1 and L2 be interpreted
in the same class M of models.
• L2 is at least as expressive as L1, if for every formula A in L1, there
is a formula B in L2 such that for all M in M and w in M, we have
M, w  A iff M, w  B.
• L2 is more expressive than L1, or L1 is less expressive than L2, if L2 is
at least as expressive as L1 but not vice versa.
• L2 is equally expressive as L1, if L2 is at least as expressive as L1 and
vice versa.
As noted above, OB is definable in terms of ⇛, as OB =df ⊤ ⇛ B, thus
L⇛ is at least as expressive as LO. To show that L⇛ is more expressive than
LO, we only need to show that LO is not at least as expressive as L⇛. Observe
that even the simple formula p ⇛ q in L⇛ seems to be not definable with LO
formulas. Thus we only need to construct two models that are distinguishable
by p ⇛ q but not by any LO formulas. Before doing this, let us illustrate the
non-triviality of the construction with some discussions.
Let two pointed models (M, w) and (M′, w′) be given. Firstly, consider the
case where Op holds at both w and w′. In this case, from Prop. 5, it follows that
p ⇛ q ↔ Oq are both true at w and w′. Thus although Op cannot distinguish
(M, w) and (M′, w′), p ⇛ q cannot distinguish either, because otherwise Oq
can distinguish the two pointed models too. This is not consistent with our
goal, and hence Op should be false at both w and w′. Secondly, consider the
case where Oq holds at both w and w′. In this case, by Fact 4, we have that
p⇛ q holds at w and w′ as well, thus p⇛ q cannot distinguish the two pointed
models. This is contrary to our goal too, and hence Oq should be also false at
both w and w′. All in all, to construct two models that are distinguishable by
p⇛ q but not by any LO formulas, we need to construct two models where Op
and Oq are both false at the designated worlds.
Before constructing the desired models, we define a notion of bisimulation
for LO, which we call ‘O-bisimulation’.7
Definition 7 (O-Bisimulation). Let M = 〈W,S, V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′, S′, V ′〉 be
models. Say R ⊆ W ×W ′ is an O-bisimulation between M and M′, if R is
nonempty, and if wRw′, then the following conditions are satisfied:
7The usage ‘O-bisimulation’ may be a bit loose, since we are unsure whether the Hennessy-
Milner-style theorem holds for it. But this does not affect the results below.
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(Atom) w and w′ satisfy the same propositional variables.
(O-Zig) if for all u, v, x ∈W such that Swuv and Swux, then there exist u′, v′, x′ ∈
W ′ such that S′w′u
′v′ and S′w′u
′x′, and there are y′, z′1, z
′
2 ∈ {u
′, v′, x′} such
that uRy′, vRz′1 and xRz
′
2.
(O-Zag) if for all u′, v′, x′ ∈ W ′ such that Sw′u′v′ and Sw′u′x′, then there exist
u, v, x ∈ W such that Swuv and Swux, and there are y, z1, z2 ∈ {u, v, x}
such that yRu′, z1Rv′ and z2Rx′.
We say that (M, w) and (M′, w′) are O-bisimilar, written (M, w) ↔O (M′, w′),
if there is an O-bisimulation between M and M′ that contains (w,w′).
It is instructive to give some explanations for the conditions (O-Zig) and
(O-Zag). Intuitively, (O-Zig) says that if wRw′ and u has two (not necessarily
different) successors v and x with respect to the accessibility relation Sw, then
there exists u′ in M′ such that u′ has two (not necessarily different) successors
v′ and x′ with respect to the accessibility relation S′w′ , and each of u, v, x is R-
related to at least one of u′, v′, x′ (possibly not in order). The intuitive meaning
of (O-Zag) is similar.
It is easy to see that ↔O is the largest O-bisimulation and an equivalence
relation. The proposition below states that, LO is not able to tell apart any
two O-bisimilar pointed models. That is, any formula in LO is invariant under
O-bisimulation.
Proposition 8. Where M = 〈W,S, V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′, S′, V ′〉 are models such
that w ∈ W and w′ ∈W ′, if (M, w) ↔O (M′, w′), then (M, w) ≡O (M′, w′).
Proof. Suppose that (M, w) ↔O (M
′, w′). We show by induction that for all
A ∈ LO, we have
M, w  A ⇐⇒ M′, w′  A.
The Boolean cases are trivial. We need only show the case for OA.
Assume that M, w 2 OA. Then there are u, v ∈ W such that Swuv and
M, u  A and M, v 2 A. We consider two cases.
• There is no x such that x 6= v and Swux. By (O-Zig), there are u′, v′, x′ ∈
W ′ such that S′w′u
′v′ and S′w′u
′x′, and there are y′, z′1, z
′
2 ∈ {u
′, v′, x′}
such that u ↔O y′ and v ↔O z′1 and v ↔O z
′
2. We now consider the
following subcases.
– y′ = u′. Since u ↔O y′, by induction hypothesis and M, u  A, we
have M′, u′  A. Similarly, from v ↔O z′1 it follows that z
′
1 2 A.
Then z′1 6= u
′, and thus z′1 = v
′ or z′1 = x
′. Hence v′ 2 A or x′ 2 A,
either of which entails M′, w′ 2 OA.
– y′ = v′. Since u ↔O y′, by induction hypothesis and M, u  A, we
have M′, v′  A. By a similar argument to the first subcase, from
v ↔O z
′
1 we can obtain that z
′
1 6= v
′, which means that z′1 = u
′ or
z′1 = x
′. If z′1 = u
′, then u′ 2 A, and therefore M′, w′ 2 OA. If
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z′1 = x
′, then x′ 2 A, due to S′w′u
′v′ and S′w′u
′x′ and v′  A, no
matter whether u′  A or u′ 2 A, we both have M′, w′ 2 OA.
– y′ = x′. Analogous to the second subcase, we get thatM′, w′ 2 OA.
Either subcase implies that M′, w′ 2 OA.
• There is an x such that x 6= v and Swux. By (O-Zig), there are u
′, v′, x′ ∈
W ′ such that S′w′u
′v′ and S′w′u
′x′, and there are y′, z′1, z
′
2 ∈ {u
′, v′, x′}
such that u ↔O y′, v ↔O z′1 and x ↔O z
′
2. Analogous to the first case,
we need to check three subcases.
– y′ = u′. Since u ↔O y′, by induction hypothesis and M, u  A,
we have M′, u′  A. Since v ↔O z
′
1 and M, v 2 A, using induction
hypothesis, we inferM′, z′1 2 A. Thus z
′
1 6= u
′, i.e. z′1 = v
′ or z′1 = x
′,
then v′ 2 A or x′ 2 A, either of which implies M′, w′ 2 OA.
– y′ = v′. Since u ↔O y′, by induction hypothesis and M, u  A, we
have M′, v′  A. By a similar argument to the first subcase, from
v ↔O z′1 we can obtain that z
′
1 6= v
′, which means that z′1 = u
′ or
z′1 = x
′. If z′1 = u
′, then u′ 2 A, and therefore M′, w′ 2 OA. If
z′1 = x
′, then x′ 2 A, due to S′w′u
′v′ and S′w′u
′x′ and v′  A, no
matter whether u′  A or u′ 2 A, we both have M′, w′ 2 OA.
– y′ = x′. Analogous to the second subcase, we get thatM′, w′ 2 OA.
Again, either subcase implies that M′, w′ 2 OA.
In either case, we conclude that M′, w′ 2 OA. The converse is similar.
Proposition 9. L⇛ is more expressive than LO.
Proof. Consider the models M = 〈W,S, V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′, S′, V ′〉, where
• W = {s, t, u, v}, Ss = {(t, u), (t, v)}, St = Su = Sv = ∅, V (p) = {s, t},
V (q) = {s, v};
• W ′ = {s′, t′, u′, v′}, S′s′ = {(t
′, u′), (t′, v′)}, S′t′ = S
′
u′ = S
′
v′ = ∅, V
′(p) =
{s′, v′}, V ′(q) = {s′, t′}.
The two models are visualized below:
sp,q tp,¬q
u¬p,¬q
v¬p,q
M
s′p,q t
′
¬p,q
u′¬p,¬q
v′p,¬q
M′
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Define R = {(s, s′), (t, v′), (v, t′), (u, u′)}. One may easily verify thatR is indeed
a O-bisimulation between M and M′. Since (s, s′) ∈ R, we have (M, s) ↔O
(M′, s′). Due to Prop. 8, (M, s) and (M′, s′) cannot be distinguished by any
LO formulas.
However, the two pointed models can be distinguished by an L⇛ formula
p ⇛ q, since M, s  p ⇛ q but M′, s′ 2 p ⇛ q. To see M′, s′ 2 p ⇛ q,
just notice that S′s′t
′u′ and (t′  p ⇐⇒ u′  p) but it is not the case that
(t′  q ⇐⇒ u′  q).
5 A sound proof system
In this section we present a proof system for L⇛ and show its soundness with
respect to the class of all frames.
Definition 10 (Proof system LS). The proof system LS consists of the following
axiom schemas and inference rules.
A0 all instances of tautologies
A1 OB → (A⇛ B)
A2 (A⇛ B)→ (OA→ OB)
A3 O(A↔ B)↔ (A⇚⇛ B)
A4 (A⇛ B) ∧ (B ⇛ C)→ (A⇛ C)
A5 (A⇛ B1) ∧ · · · ∧ (A⇛ Bn)→ (A⇛ #(B1, · · · , Bn)),
where # is an n-ary Boolean connective.
R1 from A→ B and A infer B
R2 from A infer OA
The intuition of the axioms can be explained as below. A1 says if the truth
value of a formula is fixed, then no matter whether the truth value of the
subvenient is fixed, the truth value of the formula is still fixed; A2 says fixing
the truth value of the subvenient fixes the truth value of the supervenient,
which characterizes the core idea of supervenience; A3 says that, saying the
truth value of a biconditional is fixed, amounts to saying that its conditionals
supervene on/determine each other; A4 says that supervenience is transitive (see
the preceding paragraph of Prop. 3); A5 can be seen as a counterpart in L⇛
of the validity of the supervenience-determined consequence relation between
{B1, · · · , Bn} and #(B1, · · · , Bn), i.e. B1, · · · , Bn V #(B1, · · · , Bn), which
means that once the truth value of each Bi is fixed, the truth value of their
Boolean compound is also fixed.
Proposition 11.
1. ⊢ A⇛ A
2. ⊢ A⇚⇛ ¬A
3. ⊢ OA→ ((A⇛ B)↔ OB).
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4. ⊢ O(A↔ B)→ (OA↔ OB).
5. ⊢ A⇛ B1 ∧ · · · ∧A⇛ Bm → A⇛ B, where B is a Boolean compound of
B1, · · · , Bm.
6. ⊢ (OA1 ∧ · · · ∧ OAn) → O#(A1, · · · , An), where # is an n-ary Boolean
connective.
7. ⊢ (A⇚⇛ B)→ (C ⇛ A↔ C ⇛ B) ∧ (A⇛ C ↔ B ⇛ C)
8. If ⊢ A, then ⊢ B ⇛ A.
9. If ⊢ A↔ B, then ⊢ A⇛ B.
10. If ⊢ A↔ B, then ⊢ OA→ OB.
Item 1 concerns the reflexivity of supervenience: everything supervenes on
itself (see the preceding paragraph of Prop. 3). Item 2 can be understood in a
way that every formula and its negation are entirely about the same subject-
matter [23]. The intuition of item 3 can be seen from the discussion before
Prop. 5. Item 4 says that if the truth value of a biconditional is fixed, then
the truth value of one of its sides is fixed if and only if the truth value of
another is fixed. Item 5 corresponds to ‘compositionality principle’: the truth
value of a Boolean formula supervenes on/is determined by its components;
in other words, if the truth value of its components are fixed, the truth value
of the Boolean formula itself is also fixed. Item 7 says that if two formulas
supervene on each other, then either of them can be replaced with the other, no
matter whether they are the subvenient or the supervenient of other formulas.
Item 8 says that provable formulas supervene on anything. Item 9 says provable
equivalents supervene on each other. Note that items 6 and 10 are respectively
the axiom schema (OComp) and the inference rule (OCong) of the proof system
LO in [27].
Proposition 12 (Soundness of LS). The proof system LS is sound with respect
to the class of all frames.
Proof. We only show the validity of axiom A3. Let a pointed model (M, w)
where M = 〈W,S, V 〉 be given.
Firstly, supposeM, w  O(A↔ B), we need to show thatM, w  A⇚⇛ B,
that is to show, M, w  (A ⇛ B) ∧ (B ⇛ A). We show M, w  A ⇛ B, the
proof for M, w  B ⇛ A is similar. Assume for any u, v ∈ W such that Swuv
and (M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A). From the supposition and Swuv, it follows
that (M, u  A ↔ B ⇐⇒ M, v  A ↔ B). Then it is easy to show that
(M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B). Therefore,M, w  A⇛ B.
Conversely, suppose M, w  A ⇚⇛ B, i.e., M, w  (A ⇛ B) ∧ (B ⇛ A).
Assume for any u, v ∈ W such that Swuv, we need to show that (M, u 
A ↔ B ⇐⇒ M, v  A ↔ B). By supposition and Swuv, we obtain that
(M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A) ⇐⇒ (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B). From this it
follows that (M, u  A↔ B ⇐⇒ M, v  A↔ B), as required.
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6 Generalized supervenience logics
So far we have been devoted to the dyadic supervenience operator, a function
taking a pair of formulas as arguments. We now generalize this case into the case
when the supervenience operator takes any finitely many formulas as arguments.
In detail, the generalized language (denoted L⇛∞) is defined as
A ::= p | ¬A | A ∧A | (A, · · · , A)⇛ A
Where the construct (A, · · · , A)⇛ A contains n+ 1 formulas for any n ∈ N.
The Kripke model of L⇛∞ is defined as that of L⇛. The new construct
(A1, · · · , An)⇛ B is interpreted as follows:
M, w  (A1, · · · , An)⇛ B ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈M such that Swuv,
if (M, u  Ai ⇐⇒ M, v  Ai) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n},
then (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B).
Recall the semantics of the operator D in Sec. 2.3. One may easily see that the
interpretation of the operator D in the language LD is a special case of that of
⇛ in L⇛∞ , when S is defined in a way such that Swuv just in case wRu and
wRv for all w, u, v in the underlying model.
We could also consider a class of languages L⇛n for all n ∈ N, defined
inductively as follows:
A ::= p | ¬A | A ∧ A | (A, · · · , A)⇛n A
Where ⇛n is an n+1-ary operator for each n and interpreted by the following:
M, w  (A1, · · · , An)⇛n B ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈ M such that Swuv,
if (M, u  Ai ⇐⇒ M, v  Ai) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n},
then (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B).
Then the agreement operator O in Section 2.2 is ⇛0, and the supervenience
operator ⇛ in Section 3 is ⇛1. Accordingly, LO is L⇛0 and L⇛ is L⇛1 .
It should be clear that for all n ∈ N, (A1, · · · , An) ⇛n B is logically equi-
valent to (A1, · · · , An)⇛ B. This implies that L⇛∞ is an extension of L⇛n for
any n ∈ N, and thus L⇛∞ is at least as expressive as L⇛n for any n ∈ N.
Moreover, we have seen that ⇛0 is definable in terms of ⇛1, as OA =df
⊤ ⇛1 A, or equivalently, ⊥ ⇛1 A. In general, ⇛n is definable in terms of
⇛n+1, as (A1, · · · , An) ⇛
n B =df (⊤, A1, · · · , An) ⇛
n+1 B, or equivalently,
(⊥, A1, · · · , An)⇛n+1 B.
Similar to Fact 4 and Prop. 5, we can show
Proposition 13. For all A,B,C ∈ L⇛2 ,
1.  (C ⇛1 B)→ ((C,A)⇛2 B).
2.  (C ⇛1 A)→ (((C,A)⇛2 B)↔ (C ⇛1 B)).
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In general, we have
Proposition 14. Let n ∈ N. For all A1, · · · , An, An+1, B,
1.  ((A1, · · · , An)⇛n B)→ ((A1, A2, · · · , An+1)⇛n+1 B).
2.  ((A1, · · · , An)⇛n An+1)→ (((A1, · · · , An+1)⇛n+1 B)↔ ((A1, · · · , An)⇛n
B)).
In Prop. 9, we have shown that L⇛1 is more expressive than L⇛0 . We guess
the result can be generalized to the following, which we leave for future work.
Conjecture 15. For all n ∈ N, L⇛n+1 is more expressive than L⇛n .
In what follows, for the sake of presentation, we define uM(A) for all formulas
A and all valuations u such that uM(A) = T iffM, u  A, and we will drop the
superscript M when it is clear.
So far we have considered the supervenience of a formula on another (or a set
of formulas). We can generalize this kind of supervenience to the supervenience
of a set of formulas on another set. For all n,m ∈ N,
M, w  (A1, · · · , An)⇛nm (B1, · · · , Bm) ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈M such that Swuv,
if u(Ai) = v(Ai) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n},
then u(Bj) = v(Bj) for all j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}.
Intuitively, it means that the set of formulas B = {B1, · · · , Bm} supervenes
on another set A = {A1, · · · , An}. One may easily verify that the empty set
supervenes on everything.
Note that ⇛nm is interdefinable with ⇛
n (viz. ⇛n1 ). Firstly, the operator
⇛n is definable with ⇛nm, as
((A1, · · · , An)⇛
n B) =df ((A1, · · · , An)⇛
n
m (B, · · · , B)),
where B occurs m times. Conversely, ⇛nm is definable in terms of ⇛
n, as
((A1, · · · , An)⇛
n
m (B1, · · · , Bm)) =df
∧
1≤i≤m
((A1, · · · , An)⇛
n Bi).
This is similar to the interdefinability result of the relations ‘supervenience1’
(between a property and a class of properties) and ‘supervenience’ (between
two classes of properties) [22, pp. 102-103].
Recall the determinacy operator D in Section 2.3, whose semantics is a
special case of that of the generalized supervenience operator ⇛. Like ⇛, We
can do the similar thing for the operator D, and denote LD0 , LD1 , · · · , LDn ,
respectively, the 1-argument, 2-argument, · · · , n+1-argument fragments of LD,
all of which have, respectively, D0(= ∆), D1, · · · , Dn as the sole primitive
modalities. Also, we write LD∞ for LD. We can see that LD0 is L∆. We will
show that all LDi (where i ∈ N ∪ {∞}) are equally expressive.
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As observed in [11], when D is defined on arbitrary models, i.e. the access-
ibility relation R is arbitrary:
M, w  D(A1, · · · , An;B) ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈W such that wRu and wRv,
if (M, u  Ai ⇐⇒ M, v  Ai) holds for all i ≤ n,
then (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B).
Then D is definable in terms of the necessity operator . And since  is
definable in terms ofD on the class of reflexive models (but not in general). Thus
LD is equally expressive as standard modal logic L on the class of reflexive
models. We will show, however, in general, i.e. on the class of all models, LD
is less expressive than L.
In [11, Section 8.2], the authors listed an open research direction on how to
axiomatize LD over various classes of frames. In this section, we resolve this
issue.
6.1 Comparing the expressive power of L∆ and LD
In this part, we will demonstrate that all LDi (where i ∈ N ∪ {∞}) are equally
expressive on the class of all models. Specifically, L∆ is equally expressive as LD
on that class. In the sequel, the accessibility relation R has no any constraints.
It should be clear that ∆ = (D0) is definable in terms of D1, as  ∆B ↔
D1(⊤;B). Thus LD1 is an extension of L∆. Also,  D
1(A;B) ↔ D2(⊤, A;B),
thus LD2 is an extension of LD1 . In general, we have  D
n(A1, · · · , An;B) ↔
Dn+1(⊤, A1, · · · , An;B). Thus for m ≤ n ∈ N, LDn is at least as expressive as
LDm , and LD(= LD∞) is at least as expressive as all LDi . We will show that D
is also definable in terms of ∆. Before that, we first give some appetizers. We
have that
D(A;B)↔ (∆(A→ B) ∨∆(A→ ¬B)) ∧ (∆(¬A→ B) ∨∆(¬A→ ¬B))
and
D(A1, A2;B) ↔ (∆(A1 ∧ A2 → B) ∨∆(A1 ∧ A2 → ¬B))∧
(∆(¬A1 ∧ A2 → B) ∨∆(¬A1 ∧ A2 → ¬B))∧
(∆(A1 ∧ ¬A2 → B) ∨∆(A1 ∧ ¬A2 → ¬B))∧
(∆(¬A1 ∧ ¬A2 → B) ∨∆(¬A1 ∧ ¬A2 → ¬B))
Now we lift the results to a general level. Let {A1, · · · , An} be a finite
nonempty set of formulas. For each T ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, let BT be the conjunction
B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bn such that if i ∈ T , then Bi = Ai; otherwise, Bi = ¬Ai. The
definition of BT is very similar to Kim’s notion of B-maximal properties [34,
p. 58], which though was defined for properties rather than formulas. The
notion was also introduced in [11, p. 5], for different purposes. The BT is very
important in proving our results below, and we thus give some explanations.
Intuitively, the conjuncts of BT consist of either Aj or ¬Aj for each j ∈
{1, · · · , n}. For example, B∅ = ¬A1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬An, B{1} = A1 ∧ ¬A2 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬An,
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and B{1,··· ,n} = A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An. It is easy to check that
∨
T⊆{1,··· ,n}BT is a
tautology.
We are now ready to show the general validity: for all n ∈ N, we have
 D(A1, · · · , An;B) ↔
∧
T⊆{1,··· ,n}(∆(BT → B) ∨∆(BT → ¬B)),
Therefore, D is definable in terms of ∆.
Proposition 16. For all n ∈ N,
 D(A1, · · · , An;B)↔
∧
T⊆{1,··· ,n}
(∆(BT → B) ∨∆(BT → ¬B)).
Proof. Given any n ∈ N and any pointed model (M, w). Suppose, for a con-
tradiction, that M, w  D(A1, · · · , An;B) but M, w 2
∧
T⊆{1,··· ,n}(∆(BT →
B) ∨ ∆(BT → ¬B)). Then there exists T
′ ⊆ {1, · · · , n} such that M, w 2
∆(BT ′ → B) andM, w 2 ∆(BT ′ → ¬B). It follows that there are u, v with wRu
and wRv such thatM, u  BT ′ ∧¬B andM, v  BT ′ ∧B. Thus w has two suc-
cessors that agree on the truth value of Ai for each i ∈ [1, n] but not on the truth
value of B, which is contrary to the supposition thatM, w  D(A1, · · · , An;B).
Conversely, suppose that M, w 2 D(A1, · · · , An;B). Then there are u, v
such that wRu,wRv and (M, u  Ai ⇐⇒ M, v  Ai) for each i ∈ [1, n], but
it is not the case that (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B). W.l.o.g. we may assume
that M, u  B and M, v 2 B. Thus M, u 2 ¬B and M, v  ¬B. Now let
T = {k ∈ [1, n] | Ak are true at u}. Recall that u and v agree on Ai for all
i ∈ [1, n]. Then it is easy to show that both u and v satisfy every conjunct Bi
of BT : according to the construction of BT as above, if i ∈ T , then Bi = Ai are
true at u (and thus also at v); if i /∈ T , then Bi = ¬Ai is also true at u (thus
also at v).
We have thus proved that w has two successors u and v, of which both satisfy
BT but only u satisfies B. Thus M, u  BT → B but M, v 2 BT → B, and
hence M, w 2 ∆(BT → B); similarly,M, u 2 BT → ¬B butM, v  BT → ¬B,
and hence M, w 2 ∆(BT → ¬B). Therefore, M, w 2 ∆(BT → B) ∨∆(BT →
¬B) for some T ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, i.e. M, w 2
∧
T⊆{1,··· ,n}(∆(BT → B) ∨∆(BT →
¬B)).
According to the above analysis and Prop. 16, we have demonstrated our
claim in the opening paragraph of this part.
Proposition 17. All LDi (where i ∈ N ∪ {∞}) are equally expressive on the
class of all models. In particular, L∆ is equally expressive as LD on that class.
As a corollary, we obtain
Corollary 18. L∆ is equally expressive as LD on the class of universal models.
It is known that
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Proposition 19. (c.f. e.g. [9, Sec. 3.1]) L∆ is less expressive than the standard
modal logic L over the class of all models, the class of D-models, the class of
B-models, the class of 4-models, the class of 5-models, whereas the two logics
are equally expressive over the class of T -models.
As a corollary of Prop. 17 and Prop. 19, we obtain the following expressivity
results.
Corollary 20. LD is less expressive than the standard modal logic L over
the class of all models, the class of D-models, the class of B-models, the class
of 4-models, the class of 5-models, whereas the two logics are equally expressive
over the class of T -models.
6.2 Axiomatizing LD over various frame classes
In the above part, we have shown that LD is equally expressive as L∆, as the
determinacy operator D and the non-contingency operator ∆ are interdefinable
with each other. As we know, axiomatizations of L∆ over various classes of
frames have been given in the literature, see Sec. 2.1 for a survey. We may thus
obtain the axiomatizations of LD from those of L∆ via some translations.
We first define a translation t∆ : L∆ → LD as follows:
t∆(p) = p
t∆(¬A) = ¬t∆(A)
t∆(A ∧B) = t∆(A) ∧ t∆(B)
t∆(∆A) = D(ǫ; t∆(A)) (where ǫ is the empty sequence of formulas)
The translation tD from LD to L∆ is defined by the following:
tD(p) = p
tD(¬A) = ¬tD(A)
tD(A ∧B) = tD(A) ∧ tD(B)
tD(D(A1, · · · , An;B)) =
∧
T⊆{1,··· ,n}(∆(tD(BT )→ tD(B)) ∨∆(tD(BT )→ ¬tD(B)))
Where BT is defined as in Sec. 6.1.
From the definition of tD, it follows that LD is at least exponentially more
succinct than L∆.
We now construct the proof systems of LD over various frame classes. Recall
the proof systems for L∆ in Section 2.1. Given any proof system S∆ mentioned
above, we define the system SD for LD to be the extension of S∆ plus the
following axiom schemas: for each n ∈ N+,
Dn D(A1, · · · , An;B)↔
∧
T⊆{1,··· ,n}(∆(BT → B) ∨∆(BT → ¬B)).
In the sequel, we will show the completeness of SD over various classes of
frames. The strategy is via a reduction to the completeness of S∆: if S∆ is
sound and strongly complete with respect to a class F of frames, then so is SD.
Firstly, we show that
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Proposition 21. For all A ∈ LD, we have
⊢SD A↔ tD(A).
Proof. By induction on A. The base case and boolean cases are straightforward
from the definition of tD and induction hypothesis. We only need to consider
the case D(A1, · · · , An;B).
By induction hypothesis, we have ⊢SD Ai ↔ tD(Ai) for all natural numbers
i ∈ [1, n], and ⊢SD B ↔ tD(B). Given any T ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, according to the
construction of BT , we can thus obtain ⊢SD BT ↔ tD(BT ). By the axiom TAUT
and the rule RE∆, we have
⊢SD (
∧
T⊆{1,··· ,n}
(∆(BT → B) ∨∆(BT → ¬B)))
↔ (
∧
T⊆{1,··· ,n}
(∆(tD(BT )→ tD(B))∨∆(tD(BT )→ ¬tD(B))))
Then by the axiom Dn and the definition of tD(A1, · · · , An;B), we obtain
⊢SD D(A1, · · · , An;B)↔ tD(A1, · · · , An;B).
Therefore we have now completed the proof of the proposition.
Theorem 22. Let S∆ be a proof system for L∆ given in Sec. 2.1. If S∆ is
sound and strongly complete with respect to a class F of frames, then so is SD.
Proof. The soundness of SD is immediate from the soundness of S∆ and Prop. 16.
As for the strong completeness, given any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LD and a class F of
frames, suppose that Γ F A, then by Prop. 21 and the soundness of SD, we
have tD(Γ) F tD(A), where tD(Γ) = {tD(B) | B ∈ Γ}. As S∆ is strongly com-
plete with respect to F and tD(Γ)∪{tD(A)} ⊆ L∆, we obtain tD(Γ) ⊢S∆ tD(A).
Since SD is an extension of S∆, every deduction in S∆ is also a deduction in SD,
whence tD(Γ) ⊢SD tD(A). Then using Prop. 21 again, we derive that Γ ⊢SD A.
Therefore SD is strongly complete with respect to F .
By Thm. 1, we have a lot of completeness results. In particular,
Corollary 23. 1. CL + Dn is sound and strongly complete with respect to
the class of all frames, and also the class of D-frames.
2. CLS5 + Dn is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of
S5-frames.
We have thus also shown that CLS5+Dn is sound and strongly complete with
respect to the class of S5-models, thus every consistent set of such a system is
satisfied on an S5-model. By using the generated submodel method (c.f. e.g. [1]),
each such consistent set is also satisfied on a universal model. Therefore, CLS5+
Dn is sound and strongly complete over universal models. Thus we also give an
alternative axiomatization for LD over universal models, in contrast to [11,
Sec. 7.2].
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Corollary 24. CLS5+Dn completely axiomatizes LD over the class of universal
models.
7 Conclusion and Future work
In this contribution, due to the philosophical importance of the concept of super-
venience, and inspired by the notion of supervenience-determined consequence
relation and the semantics of agreement operator in the literature, we have pro-
posed a modal logic of supervenience L⇛, which has the dyadic modality of
supervenience as a sole primitive modality. We have argued for the naturalness
of the semantics of ⇛, in that it corresponds to the supervenience-determined
consequence relation, in a similar way that the strict implication corresponds
to the inference-determined consequence relation. We have shown that this lo-
gic is more expressive than the modal logic of agreement LO, by introducing a
notion of bisimulation for L⇛. We have also presented a sound proof system
LS for L⇛, which, we think, captures the intuition of supervenience. We have
also generalized the discussion on the dyadic operator of supervenience into
the case where the supervenience operator takes any finitely many formulas as
arguments. Moreover, we have shown that non-contingency logic L∆ and pro-
positional logic of determinacy LD are equally expressive over the class of all
models, thus also equally expressive over the class of universal models; we have
also given proof systems of LD over various frame classes, whose completeness
are shown via a reduction to the completeness proof for the corresponding ax-
iomatizations for L∆, thereby resolving an open research direction listed in [11,
Sec. 8.2]. Last but not least, we have also established an alternative axiomatiz-
ation for LD over universal models.
Although we do not have the completeness result for LS, we do hope that
our study will open up a new research direction for the philosophical notion of
supervenience from the viewpoint of philosophical logic. There are lots of future
work to be continued, some of which are listed below.
7.1 Completeness proof for LS
Recall that LS has been established in Sec. 5 and shown to be sound with respect
to the class of all frames. Although we conjecture that LS is also strongly
complete with respect to that class, the completeness result is open. If we
adopt the Henkin’s canonical model method, then a natural candidate for the
canonical model of LS is as follows:
Definition 25 (Canonical Model for LS).
• W c = {w | w is a maximal consistent set for LS}
• Sc is defined such that for every w ∈ W c, we have
Scwuv ⇐⇒ for all A,B, if A⇛ B ∈ w and (A ∈ u ⇐⇒ A ∈ v),
then (B ∈ u ⇐⇒ B ∈ v).
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• V c(p) = {w ∈ W c | p ∈ w}.
Then it is straightforward to show the ‘if’ part in the Truth Lemma, i.e.,
for all A ∈ L⇛, for all w ∈ W
c, we have Mc, w  A ⇐⇒ A ∈ w. In order to
obtain the ‘only if’ part, we need (and only need) to show:
Proposition 26. let C ⇛ D /∈ w with w ∈ W c. Then there exist u, v ∈ W c
such that Scwuv and (C ∈ u ⇐⇒ C ∈ v) but D ∈ u and D /∈ v.
We do not know how to show this proposition in the current stage, we even
do not whether it holds. We leave it for future work. If the above proposition
is shown, then we get not only the completeness result over the class of all
frames, but also that over the class of reflexive and symmetric frames, since Scw
is reflexive and symmetric for all w ∈ W c. Besides, we can also investigate the
extensions of LS on special frame classes, specifically, the axiomatizations over
universal frames/models.
7.2 Comparing the expressive powers of L⇛n and L⇛n+1
We also leave Conjecture 15 for future work, which states that for all n ∈ N,
L⇛n+1 is more expressive than L⇛n . The proof strategy should be similar to
that used in showing that L⇛(= L⇛1) is more expressive than LO(= L⇛0).
In detail, first introduce a bisimulation notion for L⇛n , such that any such
bisimilar models are indistinguishable by any L⇛n formulas; then we construct
two such bisimilar models which can be distinguished by an L⇛n+1 formula.
Furthermore, the bisimulation notion for L⇛ should be an adaption of that for
LO, and both of the required bisimilar models should have at least 2n+1 worlds,
just as we need at least 4 = 22 worlds in showing Prop. 9. For the details, refer
to Sec. 4. Once we do this, we can obtain an expressive hierarchy from the
weakest LO to the strongest L⇛∞ .
7.3 Relativized agreement operator
It is worth mentioning that the semantics of A⇛ B can be rephrased as follows:
M, w  A⇛ B ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈ M such that Swuv, if (M, u  A and M, v  A),
then (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B), and,
for all u, v ∈ M such that Swuv, if (M, u  ¬A and M, v  ¬A),
then (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B).
If we define a relativized agreement operator O(·, ·) (denoted Or), as
M, w  O(A,B) ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈ M such that Swuv, if (M, u  A and M, v  A),
then (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B).
Roughly, O(A,B) means that the truth value of B is fixed under the con-
dition that A. Then (A ⇛ B) is logically equivalent to O(A,B) ∧ O(¬A,B),
and hence we have that LOr is at least as expressive as L⇛, and that also more
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expressive than the unrelativized version LO, where LOr denote the extension
of propositional logic with the relativized agreement operator Or . We conjec-
ture that LOr is more expressive than L⇛, since even the simplest LOr formula
O(p, q) seems to be not expressible in L⇛. We left it for future work. Another
research worth investigating is, of course, to axiomatize LOr over various frame
classes.
7.4 Relativized supervenience operator
We can also generalize the supervenience operator into a relativized version. In
detail, we introduce a relativized supervenience operator · ⇛· · (denoted ⇛r)
into propositional logic, and we denote the resulting language as L⇛r .
Formally, the new operator is defined as follows:
M, w  A⇛C B ⇐⇒ for all u, v ∈ M such that Swuv and M, u  C and M, v  C,
if (M, u  A ⇐⇒ M, v  A),
then (M, u  B ⇐⇒ M, v  B).
Intuitively, A⇛C B says that under the condition C, B supervenes on A. Now
the dyadic supervenience operator ⇛ is definable in terms of ⇛r, as (A ⇛
B) =df (A⇛
T B). Similar to the case for LOr , we conjecture that L⇛r is more
expressive than L⇛, for p⇛r q seems to be undefinable with any L⇛ formulas.
Moreover, we can further compare the expressive powers of L⇛r and LOr .
Note that L⇛r is at least as expressive as LOr , due to the logical equivalence
 O(A,B) ↔ (⊤ ⇛A B) (or  O(A,B) ↔ (⊥ ⇛A B)). However, the compar-
ison in expressivity is different from the case between L⇛ and LO. Recall that
L⇛ is more expressive than LO (Prop. 9). Turn to L⇛r and LOr , we observe that
A⇛C B is logically equivalent to an LOr formula O(A∧C,B)∧O(¬A∧C,B).
Therefore, L⇛r and LOr are equally expressive. Thus once we have the compar-
ison results involving one of the two logics, we have also the same comparison
results for the other logic. And also, once we have the axiomatizations for one
of the two logics, we have also the corresponding axiomatizations for the other
logic, via a reduction of completeness results.
7.5 Characterizing the supervenience-determined consequence
relation
Traditionally, Tarski’s consequence relation, called the inference-determined
consequence relation in Humberstone [23], has been used as a standard no-
tion of logical consequence, and various proof systems have been established to
characterize this notion.
Instead of the standard notion of Tarski’s consequence relation, we could
also use the notion of supervenience-determined consequence relation as logical
consequence, and present Hilbert- (and Gentzen-, etc.) style proof systems to
characterize this kind of logical consequence.
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7.6 Combing the notions of ceteris paribus and superveni-
ence
Ceteris paribus, meaning “all else being equal” or “(all) others being held con-
stant”, is a very common term in our daily life. The term has been widely used
in defining the laws in special sciences, see e.g. [51] for a survey. This notion
has also been applied to analyse the notion of preference [7, 53], counterfactual
reasoning [10], agency and games [12, 13], Fitch’s paradox [50], and the future
contingents problem [49], etc..
It may be interesting to combine ceteris paribus and supervenience, since in
that case we can naturally express the statements such as “Ceteris paribus, B su-
pervenes onA”, or more general, “Ceteris paribus, B supervenes onA1, · · · , An”.
We can then compare the new logics with our modal logic of supervenience L⇛,
in both expressivity and axiomatizations.
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